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CELL PHONES AS TRACKING DEVICES AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

R. Craig Curtis*, Michael C. Gizzi & Michael l Kittleson4
Abstract
This paper considers the Fourth Amendment issues surrounding warrantless surveillance
by law enforcement using cell phone data to track the location of suspects and the
potential application of the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in United States v. Jones to
this behavior. The paper provides an overview of the Court's historic privacy
jurisprudence from Olmstead v. United States to Katz v. United States and of the recent
decisions in Jones and Floridav. Jardines. A dataset of federal and state cases in which
the use of cell phones to track suspects was at issue was constructed and analyzed. At this
point in time, there is no clear legal standard by which the courts can provide oversight
over law enforcement in this growing area of police practice. It is suggested that the
application of Justice Scalia's trespass standard will only make the problem worse and the
probable cause standard adopted in five states could easily be applied to all jurisdictions
without limiting police effectiveness while still providing protection for the privacy rights
of Americans.
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INTRODUCTION: IT'S 10 PM AND THE POLICE MAY ALREADY KNow WHERE YOUR
CHILDREN ARE

Back in the 1960s, some television stations would run a public service
announcement just before the late evening news. A sonorous voice would intone, "It's 10
pm. Do you know where your children are?"' The announcement was intended to remind
parents that there was a curfew in place, but now, in light of the fact that local and national
law enforcement agencies are already commonly tracking the locations of people without
a warrant and without individualized suspicion, these simple words from our nation's past
remind us that modem technology empowers the police to do amazing things that are quite
inconsistent with the notions of freedom and privacy that our founders likely had in mind
when they adopted the Fourth Amendment.
The revelation in the spring of 2013 that the National Security Agency was
gathering enormous amounts of data by routinely tracking cell phone and internet traffic
stunned many in our nation.2 A major lawsuit was filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union against the federal government based on the fact that members' phones were
flagged by the data mining algorithms employed. 3 The NSA program is just the tip of the
iceberg. Police agencies in major cities already have systems in place to automatically
track cars by license plate, creating databases of who was where and when.4 Many cities
have cameras,5 although few have gone as far as London in terms of the sheer number of
cameras or as far as New York in terms of centralized receipt and automated analysis of
the images from these cameras. 6
Each year, millions of requests are made by local police departments for data
about cell phone customers from service providers, often without a warrant. The police

' The origins of the phrase can be traced to the 1960s on the East coast. See, Kara Kovalchik, The Originof "It's
10PM Do You Know Where Your Children Are?" MENTAL FLOSS (June 17, 2012, 6:00 PM),
http://mentalfloss.com/article/30945/origin-its- 10-pm-do-you-know-where-your-children-are.
2 Glenn

Greenwald, NSA CollectingPhone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5,

2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order;

Dana Priest, NSA

Growth FueledbyNeed to Target Terrorists,WASH. POST (July 21, 2013),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-growth-fueled-by-need-to-targetterrorists/2013/07/21/24c93cf4-f~bl-1 le2-bed3-b9b6fe264871 story.html.
ACLU File Lawsuit ChallengingConstitutionalityofNSA Phone Spying Program,AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION

(June 11, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-files-lawsuit-challenging-constitutionality-nsaphone-spying-program; See also, Klaymanv. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing a case in
which a private citizen sued the federal government seeking an injunction against the NSA's practices and
referencing other lawsuits requesting the same relief).
4 Catherine Crump, You Are Being Tracked: How License PlateReaders Are Being Used to RecordAmericans'

Movements, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 2 (July 2013), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreportopt-v05.pdf
Steve Henn, In More Cities A Camera On Every Corner, ParkAndSidewalk, NPR (June 20, 2013, 2:57 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/06/20/191603369/The-Business-Of-Surveillance-Cameras.
6 Rebecca

Rosen, London Riots, Big Brother Watches: CCTVCameras Blanket the UK, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9,

2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/london-riots-big-brother-watches-cctv-camerasblanket-the-uk/243356/; Robin Young & Jeremy Hobson, NYC's Web of Cameras Can Catch UnattendedBags,
HERE & Now (Apr. 24, 2013), http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/04/24/nyc-surveillance-cameras.
Ellen Nakashima, Cellphone CarriersReport Surge in SurveillanceRequests From Law Enforcement, WASH.

POST (July 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cellphone-carriers-report-surge-insurveillance-requests/2012/07/09/gJQAVk4PYWstory.html; Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records
Request, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digitalage/cell-phone-location-tracking-public-records-request; David Bresnahan, Gov't Tracking Cell Phones without
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have the ability to "ping" a phone to determine its location in real-time," or to pinpoint its
position through access to records of its use from the carrier.9 This last tool is often
referred to as cell site location information or CSLI.'o CSLI can be historical or
prospective. In the former, the police seek the past location of a cell phone user, either by
triangulating from the cell phone towers that the phone contacted in the course of
completing a call or sending a text, or from actual Global Positioning System (GPS) data
from the cell phone itself." Prospective, or real time, CSLI means that the police intend to
use the data to track the location of the suspect currently and in the future. Sixty days is a
common time period for such tracking. CSLI does not include the content of any
communication emanating from the phone.
Virtually all cell phones in existence have a GPS device included so that the
authorities can locate the phone in case of its use to call 911 in an emergency. "Smart"
phones are capable of a number of applications and uses that depend on the use of GPS
information and frequently communicate their location to cell towers. As such, such
devices may be very useful to the police if they want to track a suspect who is in
possession of a smart phone. While a few states do require, as a matter of state law, police
to obtain a warrant before gathering this kind of information,1 2 as of yet there is no clear
standard established in the federal courts to determine whether the warrantless use of this
technology is constitutionally permissible.
The nation is faced with practices that are highly attractive to and commonly
used by police, " but for which there is no legal standard for judicial oversight. Most
people are not aware of just how much data cell phone companies are storing and for how
long.' 4 This state of affairs should not be allowed to exist. The purpose of this paper is to
analyze the state of the law on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the context of the
use of data from hand held devices or the network of hardware by which they function to
locate a suspect. This is independent from the question of the warrantless search of a cell
phone or hand-held device incident to arrest, which the Court addressed in the 2014

Court Order, NEWS WITH VIEWS (Jan. 4, 2006, 1:00 AM),
http://www.newswithviews.com/BreakingNews/breaking40.htm.
' See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391-92 (D. Md. 2012). At the time of writing, the
Graham case was under appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, 4' Circuit. See also, State v. Earls, 70
A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013).
'o See Commonwealthv. Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *1-2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012).
See cases cited infra Pans II, IV, and V for details on CSLI capabilities.
12 Maine and Montana have passed statutes mandating that police obtain a warrant before seeking to track a
suspect using his or her cell phone. Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 642 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.);
Montana, H.B. No. 603, 63d Reg. Sess. (2013), http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2013/billhtml/HBO603.htm (last updated
Apr. 22, 2013). The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that a warrant is required to access locational data.
State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled similarly. Commonwealth
v. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. 2013). Three trial courts in Massachusetts have ruled that police must obtain a
warrant before accessing CSLI. See Commonwealthv. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244 (2014); Commonwealthv.
Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012); Commonwealthv. Pitt, No.
2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095, at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2012).
" Declan McCullagh, Cops to Congress: We NeedLogs ofAmeri cans' Text Messages, CNET (Dec. 3, 2012,
9:00 AM), http://news.cnet.con/8301-13578_3-57556704-38/cops-to-congress-we-need-logs-of-americans-textmessages/.
14 Allie Bohm, How Long Is Your Cell Phone Company HangingOn To Your Data?, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION
(Sept. 28, 2011, 10:17 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/how-long-your-cell-phonecompany-hanging-your-data; Cell Phone Location Tracking PublicRecords Request, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
(last visited July 29, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cell-phone-locationtracking-public-records-request.
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Term.'" The approach used by the current Justices of the United States Supreme Court to
address issues of the use of modern electronic technology by the police will be critiqued,
an exhaustive analysis of lower federal court and state court decisions will be provided,
and a legal standard that would provide both protection of the privacy rights of citizens
and adequate guidance to the police and the lower courts will be suggested.
Part I of this paper will trace the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
concerning the use of new technologies to gather information about suspects, beginning
with Olmstead v. United States,16 continuing through Katz v. United States,'7 Smith v.
Maryland', United States v. Knotts," United States v. Karo,20 and Kyllo v. United
States.2 1Part II will lay out the types of cases that have been decided by the lower courts
as a way of educating the reader about common police uses of locational data. Part III will
provide a detailed analysis of the three most recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of
the use of technology by the police, United States v. JoneS22 and Floridav. Jardines,23 and
Riley v. California.24 Part IV will explain the origins of, and the conflict between, the
Scalia "trespass standard" and the Harlan "reasonable expectation of privacy standard."
Part V will provide an overview and analysis of the cases to date that have considered the
issue of when and under what standards may the police gain access to Cell Site Location
Information. Part VI will make the case for a probable cause standard that would apply to
all uses of locational data. The standard will provide clear guidance to the police, a clear
and easily applied set of criteria for courts to use, and greater protection to the ordinary
citizen than currently exists. In order to do so, the main point that must be addressed is the
definition of "property" in this context. There must be agreement on what data the
customer owns, what data are owned by the service provider, and when and how the
customer can use the courts to protect these rights. The Court must transcend the
traditional common law notion of property as being something tangible and capable of
being owned or possessed.
PART I: TRACING THE HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE WITH
REGARD TO THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO LOCATE A SUSPECT

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of police use of communication
and/or surveillance technology is well known. The Court first was faced with the task of
applying essentially 18 th Century concepts to modem communication technology in
Olmsteadv. UnitedStates in 1928, where phone tapping was analogized to trespass.25
Later, in 1967, the Court changed course in Katz v. U.S. and held that courts should apply
26
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard in such cases. The doctrine was applied
5

' Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014). The sweeping language in Chief
Justice Roberts' majority opinion in that case is potentially relevant to the discussion of how cell phone tracking
cases may be decided and will be addressed in the Parts III, V, and VI of this paper.
16 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
"8442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).
'9 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
20 468 U.S. 705, 706
(1984).
21 533 U.S. 27, 29
(2001).
22 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
23 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417
(2013).
24 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _,
Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014).
25 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruledby
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
26 389 U.S. at 360-62 (1967) (Harlan,
J., Concurring).
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in several important cases during the time between 1967 and 2012, when U. S. v. Jones

was decided.
In Olmstead, the first major case where the Court ruled on the legality of using
technology to gather information on a suspect, government agents were investigating a
large-scale "bootlegging" operation in the city of Seattle. 2 7 Federal agents, without
seeking a warrant, tapped the office phone, and several home phones, of the bootleggers. 28
They placed the taps along existing phone wires without physical trespass on the office
spaces or homes of the conspirators. 2 9 After monitoring the taps for months, extensive
transcriptions of the conversations were compiled and introduced into evidence at the
trial.3 0 In holding that the wiretaps did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the majority
focused on the lack of physical trespass by the government agents.

'

The United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone
messages as of mailed sealed letters. The Amendment does not forbid
what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure.
The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing, and that
only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. 3
In doing so, the majority defined a search as an intrusion of a constitutionally protected
place.
"The [Fourth] Amendment itself shows the search is to be of material
things, the person, the house, his papers, his effects. The description of
the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful is that it must
2
specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." 3
The "trespass doctrine" placed the core value of Fourth Amendment protection on
constitutionally protected places. Thus, because the wiretap was done outside of the home,
there was no intrusion. The end result was that the Fourth Amendment was interpreted
quite narrowly and, as interpreted, was incapable of providing guidance regarding law
enforcement use of any electronic technologies, like telephones.
In dissent, Justice Brandeis foreshadowed the concerns that led the Court to
overrule Olmstead in 1967 in Katz v. United States.3 3 Justice Brandeis was very concerned

that the trespass standard would allow the government to intrude into the private affairs of
citizens in ways not yet developed.
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be
developed by which the government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.3 4

27

277 U.S. at 455-57.

28

Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 457.

29

30 Id.

3
32

Id. at 464.
id.

3 See id. at 471; See Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-54 (1967).
34 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.
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Brandeis also articulated a deeper understanding of the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. To him, the Amendment did more than just protect specific places. It served
as a core element of liberty.
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 35
Brandeis' view would remain in dissent for forty years, until the Court decided Katz v.
United States.

The facts in the Katz case are also simple. Mr. Katz was part of an illegal
gambling operation and was conducting that business by using a pay phone in California
to talk with his partners in crime in Boston and Miami. 36 The police were aware of this
and placed a listening device on the outside of the phone booth, where Katz would not see
it.37 This enabled them to listen to his side of the conversations, transcripts of which were
introduced at trial.38
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart took the position articulated by Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead and viewed the Fourth Amendment as a matter of privacy,
rather than trespass on private property. Stewart argued that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places, and declared that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public may be
constitutionally protected." 3 9 In doing so, Stewart explicitly acknowledged that the
rationale underlying the trespass doctrine had been eroded and "can no longer be regarded
as controlling." 4 0
It is Justice Harlan's concurrence that fleshed out the standard or test that the
Court has used to answer the question whether an activity constitutes a search: "My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable. "41

1 Id. at 478.
36 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348
(1967).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40

41

at 351 (citation omitted).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In the instant case, Katz had a subjective expectation that the government would
not listen in on his phone conversations, and that expectation was one that society was
willing to recognize as reasonable.4 2 This two prong "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test has persisted to the present day, although Justice Scalia argued that it should be
eliminated during the oral argument of U.S. v. Jones 43 and he did not rely on it in either
the Jones orJardinesdecisions. Until 2012, it was commonly understood that Justice
Stewart's opinion in Katz over-ruled the trespass doctrine, but as we will see below,
Justice Scalia has revived it in his two majority opinions in Jones and Jardines.
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine was applied in several
important cases during the time since 1967. These cases, oft cited by the lower courts in
attempting to come to grips with challenges to the use of cell phone data, include the 1979
case of Smith v. Maryland,' the 1983 case of U. S v. Knotts,46 the 1984 case of U. S v.
Karo,4 7 and the 2001 case of Kyllo v. U. 548 With few exceptions, such as Kyllo, the Court
has generally ruled against individual privacy claims.
Most relevant to cell phone location surveillance are the Court's decisions in
Smith v. Maryland U.S. v. Knotts, and U.S. v. Karo. Smith involved the use of a pen
register device to capture the phone numbers called by the phone in question.o No warrant
was issued to justify the use of the device." The Court held that there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the numbers one calls from a telephone on the basis that these
numbers are voluntarily provided by the user to the phone company which keeps the
records in the normal course of its business.52 This idea that such information is
voluntarily provided by the phone user and kept by the service provider for its own
legitimate business purposes plays a large role in the thinking of a number of judges faced
with the need to decide whether the Fourth Amendment protects cell phone subscribers
who do not wish for the authorities to use locational data stored by cell phone service
providers.5
For those judges who did attempt to wrestle with the Fourth Amendment's
meaning in the context of the use of CSLI, there are numerous citations to both U.S. v.
Knotts5 4 and U. S v. Karo." Both cases involved the placement of beepers on personal
property and the monitoring of those beepers to determine the location of the property. In
Knotts, the beeper was placed in a container of chloroform upon request by the police to

42

Id. at 360-361.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
44 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
45 442 U.S. 735, 738-41 (1979).
46 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (discussing privacy expectation with phones).
47 468 U.S. 705, 726 (1984).
48 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
49 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (holding defendants did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy).
5 442 U.S. at 737.
43

5' Id.
52

Id at 745-46.

See, e.g., In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611-12
(5th Cir. 2013).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo, 934 F. Supp. 2d 341, 354-56 (D. Vt. 2013) (citing United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
5 See, e.g., Caraballo,934 F. Supp. 2d at 354-56 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
5
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the private company that sold the chemical to the defendants.56 The request had been made
because the police believed the defendants were making illegal drugs. 7 The police used
the beeper to follow the transport of the chemical to a remote cabin in the woods in
Wisconsin.' After three days of watching the cabin, the police obtained a search warrant
and found a drug lab in operation in the cabin.' 9 In refusing to suppress the evidence
derived from the use of the beeper, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the beeper served as
nothing more than an enhancement of the police ability to follow the car while it was on a
60
public thoroughfare. In essence, the Court ruled that one has no reasonable expectation
of privacy while on public streets because one can be observed by anyone, including the
police, who happen to be on the same street.
61

U. S v. Karo was decided during the next Term and also involved the use of a beeper.
Once again, the police suspected the defendants of using bulk chemicals to make illegal
drugs and had a beeper placed in a container of ether that the defendants were planning to
use to manufacture cocaine. 62 The Court, per Justice White, upheld the conviction, but did
hold that the monitoring of the beeper while the container was inside a private residence
would violate the Fourth Amendment.63 Taken together, Knotts and Karo stand for the

proposition that the government may use technology that enhances the senses to improve
their ability to conduct surveillance in public areas without any restrictions, but to use
such technology to search a private space, such as a home, would require a warrant based
on probable cause.
This distinction between the type of privacy protection that one has in the home
and the ones that one does not have when in a public space would be important in the
decision of the last of the major cases before the 2012 U. S. v. Jones case, Kyllo v. U. .64
In Kyllo the police were using a thermal imaging camera to scan the defendant's home
after becoming suspicious that he was growing marijuana.65 The police were looking for a
heat signature consistent with the use of grow lamps.6 6 In overturning this search, the
Court, per Justice Scalia, held that this was the type of intrusion into the home that was
forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. 67 Despite expressly stating that Fourth Amendment
analysis was no longer tied to any Common Law concept of trespass,68 and despite his
open acceptance of Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy standard,69 Justice
Scalia was adamant that the Fourth Amendment must protect the home from the use of
technology that allows the police to gather information that could not be gathered with the
unaided senses of the officers.70
460 U.S. at 277.
1 Id. at 278.
56

58 Id.

at 279.
Id. at 285.
61 468 U.S. 705, 708
(1984).
62 Id. at
708.
63 Id. at
716.
64 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 32-33 (2001).
65 Id. at
29.
59 Id.

60

66

id.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 32 ("We have since decoupled violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory
violation of his property.").
69
Id at 33.
71 Id. at 34.
67
68
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PART II: WHAT KINDS OF CASES GIVE RISE TO CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF
LOCATIONAL DATA?

There are a small but growing number of federal and state court cases in which
criminal defendants are challenging the use of locational data obtained from cell phone
service providers. In the federal practice, these cases often have cumbersome sounding
names like In the Matter ofthe Application ofthe United States ofAmerica for an Order
7
Authorizing the Installationand Use ofa PenRegister and Trap and Trace Device.

Judges faced with deciding such cases do not have the benefit of clear guidance with
regard to the standard of review, so they tend to provide a recitation of existing cases in
their opinions. 7 2 Two important federal cases in this area are United States v. Graham,73
appeal of which is currently pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, and In the Matter ofthe Application ofthe United States ofAmerica for an Order
Directinga Provider ofElectronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the

Government,74 decided in 2010 by the Third Circuit. Cases in state court have also
contributed to this area of jurisprudence and in three states courts have held that their state
constitutions provide greater protection for suspects than the Fourth Amendment.

The 2010 Third Circuit case originated when federal law enforcement officers,
investigating a suspected drug trafficker, asked a federal magistrate in Pennsylvania for an
order under section 2703(d) of the Stored Communication Act directing a cell phone
service provider to disclose CSLI data on the suspect. 76 The magistrate refused to grant the
request on the grounds that the statute did not authorize the seizure of information to be
used to track a suspect.77 The district court judge affirmed the magistrate's decision, but
the Third Circuit overturned it. The rationale for doing so hinged more on an
understanding of the Stored Communications Act than on an interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment itself. 7 The Court held that the statute itself does not mandate a finding of
probable cause, the usual standard for determining whether to issue a warrant, but that a
federal magistrate, in his or her discretion, could use that standard in determining whether
to grant the warrant. In doing so, they largely avoided the Fourth Amendment issue.
United States v. Graham stems from a criminal charge against two men involved
in a string of burglaries in Baltimore, Maryland, in 2011. so The two defendants were
arrested for burglarizing two fast food restaurants."' Their cell phones were seized and

7 E.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) to Disclose
Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2012).
72 See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939,
950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
7 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012), appealfiled, No. 12-4659, (4th Cir. 2012), available at
http://docketsjustia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca4/12-4659.
74 620 F.3d 304, 305 (3d Cir. 2010).
7 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642-44 (N.J. 2013); Commonwealthv. Rushing, A.3d 939, 961 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2013); Commonwealthv. Wyatt, 2012 WL 4815307 at *6-8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012).
76 In re the Application of the United States Order Directing a Provider
of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 306 (3d. Cir 2010) (citing In re the Application of the United States for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 58889 (W.D. Pa. 2008)).
77
Id. at 308.
71

Seeid. at 315.

79 id.

s 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385-87 (D. Md. 2012).
1
Id. at 385-386.
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searched and the police became convinced that these two men were responsible for a
series of burglaries that preceded the incidents for which they were arrested.8 2 The police
sought a total of 221 days of CSLI data, under the aegis of the Stored Communications
Act.8 3 This request was granted and Sprint/Nextel complied with the order." The
defendants objected, among other things, to the long length of time that the police sought
to track their movements.' The trial court likened the records from the cell phone
provider to any other business record, essentially using the doctrine laid out in Smith v.
Maryland, which held that there is no expectation of privacy in the phone numbers one
dialed. 86 In doing so, the court tied the analysis to a personal property concept more
appropriately suited to paper documents, citing a series of other federal trial court
decisions. 7 Once the court decided to treat cell phone records as ordinary business
records, it was easy for it to rule in favor of the police. In essence, the decision to treat the
locational data as a business record allowed the court to avoid the Fourth Amendment
issue and rely solely on the lower statutory standard of "specific and articulable facts" that
is provided in the Stored Communications Act.88
In contrast to the cases in the federal courts, courts in three states, including one
state supreme court, have made clear statements that their state constitutions provide
greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment when it comes to the use of cell
phones to track suspects. The first of these cases is Pennsylvania v. Rushing. After
responding to the scene of a horrific multiple murder, the police learned that the suspect
was still at large and had professed the intention to commit further violence. They sought
and received a court order to "ping" the suspect's cell phone, and using the data along
with the GPS unit in the phone itself, were able to locate and apprehend the suspect
without his committing any further acts of violence.90 The judge granted the order based
on the "specific and articulable facts" standard stated in the then applicable version of the
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. 9 ' The suspect argued for exclusion of evidence based on the
theory that the order to "ping" his cell phone should only have been issued if there was
probable cause. 92 Pennsylvania Superior Court Justice Bowles' opinion in the case is very
detailed and carefully crafted because "[t]he ... issue Appellant levels on appeal presents
a matter of first impression in this Commonwealth, although the federal courts have
addressed the question with conflicting results." 93 The court ruled that, under
Pennsylvania law, the standard of review to be followed in considering a request for
locational data is probable cause. This reasoning was based in part on Pennsylvania
statutes, but the court stated that the Pennsylvania constitution creates greater protections
for privacy than the Fourth Amendment.9' As such, under Pennsylvania law, citizens have

82

Id. at 386.

8

Id. at 387.

84 id.
85

Id.

86

Id. at 389; Smithy. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
Graham,846 F. Supp. 2d at 389.

1

" 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (West, Westlaw through 2009 sess.).
89 Conunonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
90 Id.
91
92

Id. at 954.
Id. at 947.

93 Id. at 954.
94

Id. at 963.

95 Id. at 954.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data contained in their cell phone records. 96It
was also made clear that the combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances,
which existed in this case, was sufficient to justify a warrantless search of cell phone
records for locational data.9 7 The opinion is very thorough in terms of addressing the
details of how triangulation is used to locate suspect as well as providing citations to, and
explanations of, many federal and state cases and statutes.
The second state court case, State v. Earls," arose in New Jersey. In that case, the
Middletown Township Police were investigating a string of burglaries and had located one
of the conspirators who had provided useful evidence. 99 This informant was believed to be
at risk of harm from her partner in crime and the police, knowing the cell phone number of
the suspect and knowing that he was using a cell phone from T-Mobile, asked T-Mobile to
provide locational data, which they did.' 00 No warrant was ever sought.' 0 ' The New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Article 1, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey State
Constitution gives a person a protected privacy interest in the location of his or her cell
phone.1 0 2 This means that the police must seek a warrant from a neutral magistrate based
on probable cause before they can obtain locational data from a cell phone provider. As
with the decision in Pennsylvania v. Rushing, the New Jersey Supreme Court was careful
to fully analyze the Fourth Amendment issue and yet base their decision squarely in state
law. Also, in agreement with the Pennsylvania courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
careful to protect the interests of law enforcement by stating that probable cause and
exigent circumstances would be sufficient to justify a warrantless search, i.e., a direct
appeal to a cell phone company for data.' 03 Lastly, the New Jersey Supreme Court limited
its decision to prospective effect only, meaning that older cases with similar fact patterns
would not be revisited or re-opened. o0
In the State of Massachusetts, five cases have dealt with issues of the use of
CSLI. Three ruled in favor of the defendant and two in favor of the state. Commonwealth
v. Wyatt and Commonwealth v. Augustine ruled explicitly that the Massachusetts

constitution provides for greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment in such
cases and that the police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to access CSLI.'0 o
In contrast, Commonwealth v. Pitt ruled that the Fourth Amendment itself requires a
warrant based on a showing or probable cause before the police may use a cell phone to
locate a suspect.1 06 Commonwealth v. Princiottaruled that that since the phone in question
0 7
was not the suspect's phone, he lacked standing to challenge data from that account.
Similarly, Commonwealth v. Willis, held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge
the use of CSLI since it was her who had called 911 and the evidence in question
concerned the location of her phone when she made that call.o Of the cases wherein there
96

97

Id. at 963.

Id. at 965-66.

A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013).
Id. at 633.
100 Id.

98 70
99

101 Id. at 634.
102 Id. at 644.
103 See id.
104 Id. at
645.
105 See Commonwealthv. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244 (Mass. 2014); See also Commonwealthv.
Wyatt, No.
2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012).
106 No. NOCV2010-00061, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 39, at *31 (Feb. 23, 2012).
107 31 Mass. L. Rptr. 68, 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2013).
1os No. SUCR2012-10180, 2013 Mass. Super. LEXIS 114, at *6 (Mar. 8,2013).
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was a clear privacy issue raised by the facts, the Massachusetts courts have ruled that this
privacy issue must be resolved in favor of a warrant requirement for the use of CSLI.' 09
In Florida, where the case of Tracey v. State is, at the time of this writing,
pending before the Florida Supreme Court, the lower courts have ruled that there is no
expectation of privacy when the search only concerns the location of a suspect while he is
on the public roads. "o In that case, the sheriff's deputy who applied for the order to access
CSLI relied solely on an unsupported statement from a federal agent."' The appellate
court held that granting the order violated the state statutes that authorize access to CSLI,
but the lower court held that exclusion of evidence is not an available remedy under those
statutes.11 2 The opinion contained language that indicated that the court was sympathetic
to the notion that cell phone users do not voluntarily and knowingly convey locational
data when they possess a cell phone." 3 That the facts involve an overreach by the police
could be meaningful when the Florida Supreme Court makes its decision.
In each of these cases, the authorities wanted to obtain information from a cell
phone service provider to find the location of a suspect. In none of these instances was
there probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. In most of the cases, the
state relied on statutory provisions that purport to allow a court to issue a subpoena to a
cell phone service provider based on less than a probable cause standard. In some cases,
the authorities simply requested data from the cell phone service providers and the request
was granted without any court supervision at all." 4 These cases also show the different
approaches taken by state courts, many of which base their decisions on state
constitutional provisions, and federal courts, that tend to apply the Fourth Amendment or
applicable statutes.
PART III: UNITED STATES V. JONES AND FLORIDA V. JARDINES, AND RILEY V.
CALIFORNIA

Until the 2012 decision in U. S. v. Jones,"' the legal standard for adjudicating
claims of violations of the Fourth Amendment was clear, if not particularly predictable in
terms of outcome when applied to actual cases. Justice Harlan's famous two-prong test
was uniformly applied, even by Justice Scalia himself, to determine whether a search was
valid.116 Jones sent ripples throughout the legal and law enforcement community, not only
because it placed limits on a technological tool that was coming into widespread use, but
because the outcome was unanimous, and all nine justices agreed that a warrant was

109

See, e.g., Pitt, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 39, at *31.

110 Tracey v. Florida, 69 So. 3d 992, 993, 999-1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), appealdocketed, No. SC 11-2254,
2013 Fla. LEXIS 215 (Fla. Jan. 28, 2013).
Id. at 993.
112 Id. at 999-1000.
See id. at 996 ("We acknowledge that a compelling argument can be made that CSLI falls within a legitimate
expectation of privacy."); See also id. ("Technology evolves faster than the law can keep up, extending the
search capabilities of law enforcement and transforming our concept of privacy.").
114 See U.S. v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 346 (D. Vt. 2013), for an example of when a court order made
mention of a Sprint corporate procedure for requests for emergency release of such information; In other cases, it
is clear that there was no court order, or none was offered by the prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d
630, 633 (N.J. 2013); Peoplev. Fernandez, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1931, at *6-7 (Mar. 16, 2011);
Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 299 (Ga. 2010).
11 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
116 Kyllov. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34 (2001).
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needed, even though the justices were divided as to why." 7 To legal scholars the case
raised numerous questions due to Justice Scalia's attempt to return to the long-discarded
trespass doctrine while distancing the decision from the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard."" Justice Sotomayor's concurrence is also important in that she criticized the
third party doctrine that results from the application of Smith v. Maryland" to CSLI cases
and she seemingly embraced the mosaic approach to the Fourth Amendment.1 2 0
The facts of the Jones case are fairly well known, even if the actual path of the
case traced through the court system was convoluted and lengthy.12' The police in the
District of Columbia obtained a warrant that would allow them to place a GPS Device on
a car being used by Jones.1 2 2 The warrant allowed for the device to be placed within a ten
day window. 123 It was placed on day 11, and the attachment of the device occurred in
Maryland in a public parking lot.124 Thus, the Court treated the case as if the placement of
the GPS was warrantless. 12 Twenty-eight days of data were gathered and these data were
used at trial to convict Jones of conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs.1 2 6
Five of the Justices, led by Justice Scalia, seized on the fact that the device was
placed on the car without a valid warrant.1 2 7 In Scalia's opinion, this action constituted a
trespass at common law and this was sufficient to taint the placement of the device and all
evidence subsequently derived from the use of the device. 12 The other four Justices who
signed the majority opinion agreed that the placement of the device was tainted, but could
not all agree on Justice Scalia's trespass rationale. Justice Sotomayor agreed that the
warrantless placement of the GPS device was enough to invalidate the search, and joined
the majority on that basis, but wrote separately to reject Scalia's new trespass standard.129
In her concurrence, Sotomayor applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to hold

" The Court determined that it need not address the government's contention that Jones had no reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore there was no search "because Jones's Fourth Amendment rights do not rise
or fall with the Katz formulation." See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. Justice Sotomayor discusses the test that she
would apply to cases of GPS monitoring given "some of the unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the
Katz analysis [which] will require particular attention." Id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring). Justice Alito
states that he would analyze the issue by asking whether the long-term monitoring of the moments of the vehicle
that Jones drove violated his reasonable expectations of privacy. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., Concurring).
..See id. at 950-52.
l9 See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring) ("[Third party doctrine] is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks."); See also Smithy. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
120 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring); See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory ofthe Fourth
Amendment, Ill MICH. L. REV. 311, 327-28 (2012); See, also Commonwealth v. Augustine, Criminal Action 1110748, 2013 WL 5612574, at *5-7 (Mass. Super. Apr. 3, 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244 (2014), wherein the lower court expressly adopted the mosaic
theory.
121 There were two trials. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The first ended in a hung jury. Id. There was an appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 949. The Supreme Court vacated
Jones' conviction. United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 204 (D.D.C. 2012). Proceedings on remand
included a hearing on a motion to suppress 120 days of CSLI. See Jones 908 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
122 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
123

id.

124

id.

Id. at 949 (setting out procedural posture).
See id. at 948-49.
127 Id. at
949.
125
126

128 See id.
129

Id. at 954-57.
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that tracking the whereabouts of a person over time was not a reasonable search. 3 0 For
her, and for the four Justices who signed Justice Alito's concurring opinion, the proper test
is the reasonable expectation of privacy test.' 3
Justice Sotomayor also wrote that it is perhaps time to reconsider the third party
doctrine of Smith v. Maryland, arguing that it is "ill suited to the digital age" 3 2 and
expressly mentioned the fact that cell phone users routinely and automatically convey
information to their providers in the course of using the phone.' 3 3 This item of dicta is
especially significant when attempting to decide petitions for court order to release CSLJ.
Some commentators interpreting the Jones decision have argued that taken together, the
Sotomayor and Alito concurring opinions create something called the "mosaic" theory of
the Fourth Amendment. '14 This approach involves taking the entire set of official
behaviors in a holistic way, as opposed to examining each action taken by the government
in a sequential way.1" This type of reasoning has potential for application to cell phone
tracking cases since it seemingly would allow for the context in which cell phone data are
gathered to be considered free from the constraints of the third party doctrine.
Despite the lack of five votes for his new, and old, trespass standard, it was also
applied to decide the case of Floridav. Jardines.136Police suspected Joelis Jardines of
keeping illegal drugs inside his home and brought a K-9 unit to the defendant's front
porch.17 After the drug-sniffing dog indicated to officers that there were narcotics inside
the house, they obtained a warrant using that information as part of the presentation to the
judge. 3 8 Upon execution of the warrant, officers seized marijuana plants from inside the
home. "9 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that because the officers brought the
drug-sniffing dog physically onto the defendant's porch, they were invading the province
of his home and consequently searching it.1 40 But the court did not explain why it should
make a difference, for Fourth Amendment purposes, that the drug-sniffing dog had to be
on the defendant's porch in order to smell the plants as opposed to detecting them from
the street. Scalia's application of the trespass doctrine was particularly interesting, given
the similarities in Jardinesto the Kyllo thermal vision imaging case from a decade earlier,
where Scalia's majority opinion relied on the reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
home to disallow warrantless thermal imaging of the home.
The development of a new trespass doctrine, in effect, resurrecting Olmstead, while at the
same time leaving the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard in place, has
injected confusion and uncertainty to the Fourth Amendment. The ruling in Riley v.
California, issued in June of 2014, did little to resolve this confusion.14' The opinion
actually decided two cases in which the police had seized a cellular phone from a suspect

13

132

Id. at 956.
Id. at 956-57, 64.
Id. at 957.

'33

Id.

134

Kerr, supra note 120, at 313-14.
Id. at 314.
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
Id. at 1413.

135
136

137

138 Id.
139
40

1

141

Id.

Id. at 1417-18.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014).
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as part of a search incident to arrest.1 4 2 In both cases, the police had proceeded to search
the contents of the phone and used that evidence against the defendants in their trials.1 43
The opinion in the Riley case was written by Chief Justice Roberts, with only a special
concurrence by Justice Alito preventing a unanimous Court. The opinion shows that the
justices have educated themselves about cell phone technology, something that was long
overdue given the famous reluctance of the justices to embrace information technology.1 44
The court in several places expressly stated that cellular phones are fundamentally
different than other types of personal property that is commonly discovered in a search
incident to arrest because of the comprehensive nature of the information stored on these
devices:
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital
form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a
broad array of private information never found in a home in any form-unless
the phone is.
Additionally, the Court made it clear that cell phones can store all sorts of
sensitive personal information as well as provide access to information stored in browser
histories or stored in the cloud.
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical
records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively
different. An Internet search and browsing history, for example, can be
found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual's
private interests or concerns-perhaps a search for certain symptoms of
disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD. 146
Lastly, concerning locations, the Court was quick to note that cell phones do allow the
police to discover where a person has been with great detail.
Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart
phones and can reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the
minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.
Because of the concern for the huge amount of private data that can be accessed
whenever the police seize a cellular phone, the Court held that the police must obtain a
warrant before searching the information on the phone. The court even went so far as to
suggest strategies for protecting evidence by securing the phone against remote wiping or
data encryption.14 It should be noted that the opinion in Riley did not apply Justice
The second case was United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2013), cert granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014).
The Riley case involved as smart phone, and images and video from the phone were used as evidence. The
phone in Wurie was an older flip phone, which was used to determine the location of the suspect's home and to
justify a warrant to search that home.
144 Will Oremus, Elena Kagan Admits that JusticesHaven't QuitefiguredOut E-Mail Yet, (August 20, 2013,
3:33 pm), Future Tense,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future tense/2013/08/20/elena kagan supremecourtjustices haven t-gotten to-e
mail usepaper memos.html (last visited, June 24, 2014).
14' 573 U.S. _,
Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. at 20-21 (June 25, 2014).
146 Id. at *19.
147 Id. at *19-20.
148 Id. at *12-14.
142
143
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Scalia's trespass doctrine. The case was decided based on analysis of the two prongs,
officer safety and preventing destruction of evidence, laid out in Chimel v. California.19

PART IV: DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING AND MIXING THE TRESPASS DOCTRINE OF JONES
AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST FROM KATZ

Both standards used by the Supreme Court thus far in determining whether a
search or seizure has taken place, the trespass standard and the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard, have flaws, especially the former. Applying them to the modern world
creates problems and complications they were not designed to address. The trespass
doctrine cannot coherently address situations created by today's technology, and despite
decades of jurisprudence, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard remains
malleable and difficult for law enforcement to use. Applying the trespass doctrine is
becoming increasingly arbitrary, as shown in the two drug sniffing dog cases that have
been decided recently, Floridav. Jardinesioand Illinois v. Caballes.1' Further
complicating this area of jurisprudence is an emerging patchwork of state constitutional
provisions mimicking the Fourth Amendment, yet often providing a higher level of
protection of individual rights.15 2 All of these factors further muddy the water for law
enforcement officers, judges, and ordinary citizens trying to determine what constitutes a
violation of the rights of a suspect.
The trespass doctrine has its roots in originalism, an approach to constitutional
analysis that seeks to understand what the Constitution meant at the time the provision in
question was written when construing its meaning today.' 5 3 According to originalists like
Justice Scalia, the Fourth Amendment was only meant to protect physical spaces.'1 4 Hence
a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated unless the government has
physically trespassed onto the suspect's property. This was the rationale for deciding not
to suppress evidence obtained from listening devices attached to the phone lines of
suspects in Olmstead v, United States.'"' The Court held that no search or seizure took
place because there was no physical entry into the suspect's homes or office.16 This
outcome foreshadowed the problems the trespass doctrine would encounter in the future.
Justice Brandeis, in dissent, was quite specific - even prophetic - in wondering what new
technological developments would mean in this area of the law. 5 7
As Justice Brandeis suggested, the application of the trespass doctrine is ill-suited
for modern technological problems that complicate Fourth Amendment issues.'"" Physical
149 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
151 133 S. Ct. at 1413.

1'' 543 U.S. 405, 406-407 (2005).
152 See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 954-55 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2013); See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d
630, 632 (N.J. 2013).
'5 See United States v. Jones, 123 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012) (describing the relationship between trespass and
the Fourth Amendment); See Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of
Public Meaning Originalism,48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 578 (2011) (describing the constitutional interpretation
method of Originalism).
54
1 See Jones, 123 S. Ct. at 949-50; See Richard H. Seamon, Kyllov. UnitedStates andthe PartialAscendanceof
Justice Scalia 's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1018 (2001).
'55 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
156 Id. at 466.
'5 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
151 See id.
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intrusion is often unnecessary for law enforcement to track suspects. Tracking a suspect
by pinging a cell phone or by obtaining CSLI from a cell phone service provider gives law
enforcement the ability to record the suspect's movements over a period of time, and in
private spaces, but without any physical intrusion on the suspect's person, property, or
home. Situations like these seem to run contrary to Justice Scalia's announced purpose of
"preserv[ing] ... that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted,"'" 9 before the government had the ability to gather such
extensive information about its citizens without physically searching them or their effects.
The inadequacy of the trespass doctrine to grapple with modern technology can
lead to arbitrary results. This discrepancy is illustrated in Floridav. Jardines.16 0 Surely the
act of sending the dog to investigate the defendant's home in the first place was of more
consequence than how far away it was when it inhaled. And Jardinesonly demonstrates
the complexities of applying the trespass doctrine to search and seizure cases without the
complications added by modem technology. Imagine the difficulty in applying the
trespass doctrine to a similar situation where, instead of a dog, piece of equipment such as
a drone, or a satellite is sent to investigate a suspect. We already know, from Californiav.
Cirallo, and Floridav. Riley, that over flights by manned aircraft in search of marijuana
growing activities do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as they occur in
commercial air space.161 We also know that the use of a thermal imaging device is not
allowed on the grounds that it is a type of technology not in general use by the public.162
Would the suspect care more about whether the drone was in public air space, or the
availability of a device to the general public, or the fact that his every move inside the
privacy of his own home is being recorded? The trespass doctrine could allow such
intrusions, which is why it is ill-equipped to answer such questions. There is simply no
viable reason why a home should be constitutionally protected from a dog or a thermal
imaging camera, but not a drone.163
The combination of a trespass doctrine with the reasonable expectation of privacy
standardl64 provides another layer of complications. Jones revived the trespass doctrine
despite the fact that it was replaced in Katz with the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard.16 In Jones, Justice Scalia explained that "the Katz reasonable expectation of
1 66
privacy test has been added to, not substitutedfor, the common law trespassory test."

But the two can often conflict. How to define a reasonable expectation of privacy is
largely dependent upon judges and juries, which are in turn influenced by societal norms.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001)).
See 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (describing an application of the trespass doctrine).
161 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Floridav. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).
162 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34-35 (2001).
163 Further complicating the application of the trespass doctrine are cases like
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2005), that Jones did not overrule but seemingly add wrinkles to the doctrine's application. There the defendant
was stopped for speeding and officers had a drug-sniffing dog inspect his car without any indication of the
presence of narcotics. Id. at 406. There was in fact marijuana in the car, but the Court held that the inspection
was not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in contraband. Id. at 408-09. The Court reasoned that only where such inspections have the capability to detect
lawful activity is the Fourth Amendment implicated, and the drug-sniffing dog could only detect contraband. Id.
at 409. Although the search in Jardinesarguably had such capability, as the officers could have peered into a
window from the defendant's porch, at minimum, Caballesobscures the trespass doctrine and makes its
application even more difficult.
164 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950, 953.
165 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
(declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places).
166 132 S. Ct.
at 952.
'59
160
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The invasions of privacy that are considered reasonable can change with the times and
indeed, with changes in technology. As applied in Katz, the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard depends on the difference between "what a person knowingly exposes to
the public," which is not given Fourth Amendment protection, versus "what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public," which may be protected.167
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard evolves over time. It is also quite
subjective. What one set of justices views as reasonable may change as the Court's
membership changes and as the common uses to which a technology is put changes over
time. Thus, Justice Sotomayor's concerns about re-thinking what is a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding phone calls and bank records. The trespass doctrine, on
the other hand, is not so malleable. The definition of "physical invasion" does not change
with a suspect's desire to preserve her privacy. The trespass doctrine is essentially stuck in
the past: government actions that were considered physical invasions in the founding era
are still viewed as such today. This tension was revealed in Katz itself, where the Court
declared that a search had taken place when law enforcement eavesdropped on calls the
defendant made from a phone booth.168 Today, a well-placed camera or listening device
need not even be physically near a phone booth to record the defendant's conversation.
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, such listening would violate the
suspect's expectation of privacy. But under the trespass doctrine, such a search could be
considered legitimate because the government did not physically intrude into the phone
booth. The Jones majority does not adequately address this dilemma or explain how to
apply the two tests together when each points to a different outcome.

'

It should be acknowledged that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
does not provide a spotless alternative. That standard, espoused in Katz,169 was strongly
calculated to rebut the holding in Olmstead that the Fourth Amendment protects only
places.1 70 Instead of being based on a physical/non-physical distinction, the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard changes with society, and the defendant's, expectations.' 7
Precisely because of its ability to change with societal expectations, it is inconsistent in
application. Different judges and juries come to different conclusions about what is
reasonable, which will likely produce conflicting precedents on a regular basis.1 7 2 In
addition, such uncertainty provides imperfect guidance for law enforcement officers who
must apply the doctrine in real time and should (ideally) be able to reasonably predict the
outcome of doing so. When a faulty search might lead to the acquittal of a guilty party,
such foreseeability is extremely important.
A further complication is that the privacy expectations of cell phone users are
unclear. While the data on how Americans feel about the National Security Agency's
interceptions of cell phone and internet traffic data are mixed,1 7 3 to apply a trespass
167

389 U.S. at 351.

68

' Id. at 353.

69

Id. at 351.

170 Id.

at 351-54 (declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places).
'' See id. ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.").
172 The changes in the precision by which triangulation location can be accomplished using CSLI have caused
changes in the way that such cases are judged. CompareIn re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure
of Telecomms. Records, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), with In re Application of the U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
17' Majority say NSA tracking ofphone records "acceptable"- Washington Post-PewResearch Center poll,
WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.conpage/2010-
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standard is to rule that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in any data generated
by the use of a cellular phone and stored in the databases of the service provider. The
trespass standard does not construe such data as important since no trespass on any
property or effect of the suspect need occur for the police to access those data. In fact, it is
not clear at all that a suspect would have any protected interest at all in data held by the
cell service provider. While there has been no case explicitly on the issue of who owns
such data, the opinion in New York v. Harris reports that the trial court in that case ruled
that the defendant had no standing to challenge a subpoena directed to Twitter that ordered
the production of tweets written by the defendant and stored in Twitter's database. 74
Thus, the use of a trespass standard effectively allows the police to access any data that the
service provider elects to turn over to them, without any protection of the rights of the
user.
Further complicating modern search and seizure jurisprudence are state
constitutional and statutory provisions noted above that mirror the Fourth Amendment yet
provide more extensive protections for individuals.' 75 If the current muddled standards
continue, federal courts risk seeing this area of federal jurisprudence fade into irrelevancy
as state supreme courts create their own standards that are more protective of individual
privacy and would render Fourth Amendment protections redundant. Pennsylvania v.
Rushingl76 is a prime example. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored Jones and
adopted the reasonable expectation of privacy standard alone when interpreting Article I,
Section 8 of its own constitution. 7 7 The court also disregarded the "specific and
articulable facts" standard used by federal courts in determining when the government can
overcome a reasonable expectation of privacy and trace a suspect's location in real time. 78
Instead, the court adopted a probable cause standard. ' As noted above, the Earls court
had a similar holding limited to the New Jersey Constitution. 1so The danger with
continuing on with the unclear standard from Jones is that state courts will take their cues
2019/WashingtonPost/2013/06/10/National-Politics/Polling/release_242.xml; 59% Oppose Government's Secret
Collecting ofPhone Records, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (June 9, 2013),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/publiccontent/politics/general_politics/june_2013/59_opposegovernments
secret collecting of phonerecords; Doug Mataconis, InitialPolls Seemingly In Conflict On Public Opinion Of
NSA Surveillance Programs, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (June 11, 2013),
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/initial-polls-seemiingly-in-conflict-on-public-opiniion-of-nsa-surveillanceprograms/; Most disapprove of gov'tphone snooping of ordinaryAmericans, CBS NEWS (June 11, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588748/most-disapprove-of-govt-phone-snooping-of-ordinaryamericans/.
174 People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (Crim. Ct. 2012); See, for example, United States v. Meregildo, 883
F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), in which the court held that admission of Facebook material listed as
private by defendant, but provided by Facebook friends of the defendant, was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
'75 Maine and Montana have passed statutes mandating that police obtain a warrant before seeking to track a
suspect using his or her cell phone. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 642 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); H.B. No.
603, 63d Reg. Sess. (2013), availableat http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2013/billhtml/HBO603.htm (last updated Apr. 22,
2013).
176 Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
17 id.
I71 Id
179 id.

at 961.

" State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013); See, also, the discussion in five lower court cases from
Massachusetts: Commonwealthv. Augustine, No. 11-10748, 2013 WL 5612574, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 3,
2013), vacated, 467 Mass. 230 (Mass. 2014); Commonwealthv. Princiotta, No. 2009-00965, 2013 WL 1363901,
at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2013); Commonwealthv Willis, No. SUCR2012-10180, 2013 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 114, at *5-6 (Mar. 8, 2013); Commonwealthv. Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *7 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012); Commonwealthv. Pitt, No. 2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb.
23, 2012).
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from Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, developing their own standards and
taking this section of search and seizure jurisprudence out of the hands of federal courts.
This scenario would create yet another area of law where the rules change as one crosses
state lines, an unacceptable state of affairs when often a suspect being tracked is in one
state, the police tracking him are in another, and the data monitoring his movements are in
a third state. In order to maintain uniformity and promote predictability, federal courts
must adopt a clear standard that is more effective than the Jones rule.
PART V. AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE CASES INVOLVING POLICE USE OF
CSLI TO TRACK A SUSPECT

In order to fully explore the current state of the law with regard to police use of
CSLI to track a suspect, it is necessary to find as many trial and appellate court cases as
possible. The process used to do so is tedious, but the best available. The 2010 case In the
Matter of the Application of the United States ofAmerica for an Order Directing a
Provider ofElectronic CommunicationService to Disclose Records to the Government'8

was shepardized as a starting point. On January 7, 2014, that processed yielded 133 hits,
56 of which were trial court orders or appellate opinions that had cited this case. All of
those orders and opinions were read and content analyzed, and any earlier cases that were
cited in those orders and opinions were noted and included in the data. Trial court orders
that were subsequently addressed by appellate courts were listed only under the auspices
of the appellate court opinion to avoid double listing of cases. As a check to make sure
that all possible cases were identified, a search on Lexis was conducted using the search
term "CSLI." That search yielded 45 case hits, 11 of which were not in the data base
already and involved the police using a cell phone to track the location of a criminal
suspect. Reading those cases yielded one more case that had not been found through
earlier efforts.
Ultimately, a database of 82 court cases in which the government's use of CSLI
was at issue was compiled.18 2 The earliest case was decided in 2004.183 Of the 82 cases,
only sixteen came from state courts, and only eight came from the United States Courts of
Appeals. No United States Supreme Court case has addressed this issue and, at the time of
this writing, no petition for certiorari has been granted. One case has been appealed to the
state supreme court of Florida.8 4
In addition to case name and citation, the level of court, whether the case arose in
the state or federal systems, whether the trial court suppressed the data or refused to grant
the order, the length of time of the surveillance, information about the basis for the search,
and the rationale of the decision was recorded. Whether the order or opinion cited to U. S.
v. Jones and Katz v. U. S., the type of crime in question, and whether the request was for
historical CSLI, real time CSLI, or a ping were recorded as well.
It should be noted that most of the motions to suppress were not granted. 26 of
the 82 cases, or 32 percent ultimately resulted in suppression of the evidence, which
means that the government was able to use the evidence in 68 percent of the cases. It did
"' 620 F.3d 304, 305-06 (3d Cir. 2010). This case was chosen because it was, at the time, the first United States
Court of Appeals decision known to the authors on this issue.
182

See infra Appendix A.

U.S. v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), appealdocketed, No. SCl1-2254, 2013 Fla. LEXIS
215 (Jan. 28, 2013).
183

184
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not matter much whether the issue was before a state or a federal court, as the government
was successful in 11 of the 16, or 69 percent, of state cases and in 45 of the 66, or 68
percent, of cases heard in federal courts. Table 1 shows the number of cases and who won
by type of jurisdiction.
Table 1: Number of Cases by Who Won and Type of Jurisdiction
Defendant Won

State Won

Total

21
(32%)

45
(68%)

66
(80%)
16
(20%)

Federal Courts
State Courts

5

11

(31%)
26
(32%)

(69%)
56
(68%)

82
(100%)

There also was no clear pattern based on the time the case was heard, but it
should be noted that defendants were more successful in cases heard in 2005 (86%), 2006
( 6 0%), and 2010 (44%) than in other years. It should also be noted that the government

was successful in more than 80 percent of cases decided after 2010. Table 2 shows the
distribution of cases by year.
The pattern of results is fairly clear. Criminal defendants challenging the use of
CSLI were often successful in the earliest cases to be brought, but not in the most recent
cases. All of the early cases came from federal courts and no clear geographic pattern
appears. Defendants were successful in The District of Columbia,'1 5 Indiana,186
Maryland,'8 7 and Wisconsin.'s Some defendants were successful and some were not in
New York'" and Texas.' 90 Defendants were not successful in Louisiana,' 9 ' Ohio,1 9 2 and

&

115 In re Applications of the United States for Orders Authorizing the
Disclosure of Cell Cite Info., 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43736, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005); In re the Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (D.D.C. 2005).
186 In re the Application of the United States for an
Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register,
No. 1:06-MC-6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45643, at *14-15 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006).
In re Application for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 439 F. Supp. 2d 456, 457
(D. Md. 2006); In re the Application of the United States for Orders Authorizing Installation & Use of Pen
Registers, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391 (D. Md. 2006); In re the Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 2005).
In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site
Info., No. 06-MISC-004 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73324, at *22 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006).
189 Compare In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a
Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), andIn re the Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register and/or Trap & Trace for Mobile
Identification No. (585)111-1111, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 2006), with In re Application of United
States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
190 Compare In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp.
2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005), and In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1)
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 836-37 (S.D. Tex.
2006), with In re the Application of the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
191 In re the Application of United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register
Trap & Trace Device, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682-83 (W.D. La. 2006).
192 United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2004).
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West Virginia.' 93 In those early cases in which the evidence was allowed to be used, often
the judges cited the lack of precision of the data,' 94 the lack of standing of the
defendant,195 or the fact that the defendant's location was only tracked while he was on
public streets.196
97
Table 2: Cases by Year Decided

Defendant Won

State Won

Total

2004

0
(0%)

1
(100%)

1

2005

6
(86%)
6
(60%)
1
(25%)
1
(33%)
1
(20%)
4
(44%)
2
(20%)
2
(13%)
3
(13%)

1
(14%)
4
(40%)
3
(75%)
2
(67%)
4
(80%)
5
(56%)
8
(80%)
13
(87%)
15
(83%)

7

26
(32%)

56
(68%)

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

10
4
3

9
10
15
18
82
(100%)

One thing that does appear in cases decided before 2009 are rulings on an
apparently concerted effort by the Justice Department to craft arguments that no warrant is
required in order for the government to access CSLI. The notion was that the Stored
Communications Act,"" together with the Pen Register Statute'99 and the
193 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register
with Caller Identification Device, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (S.D.W. Va. 2006).
194 See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States or an Order, 411 F.
Supp. 2d at 680.
195 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register,
415 F. Supp. 2d at 664-66.
196 Forest, 355 F.3d
at 950-51.
197 While the limits of the Chi-Square statistic do not allow for the calculation of an accurate measurement of the
probability that the distribution of cells occurred randomly when so many cells have very small numbers of
cases, the authors did collapse the year variable into three categories - 2004 to 2006, 2007 to 2010, and 2011 to
2013, and ran a chi-Square analysis of that contingency table. The result was statistically significant at the .001
level. We are convinced that the differences by year were not random. There is a strong association between time
and outcomes.
198 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2712 (West 2014).
'99 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121-3127 (West 2014).
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Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 2 0 0 would justify access to pretty
much any type of cell phone data. Most courts rejected this "hybrid theory," 2 0 1 although
two courts in New York did not.2 02 The tone of one DC judge's order was notable in
admonishing the prosecutors, "I am afraid that I find the government's chimerical
approach unavailing. Indeed, and to keep the animal metaphor going, it reminds one of the
wag who said a camel is a horse planned by a committee."2 03
Many of these judges in early cases were convinced by arguments that the use of
CSLI is the same as the use of a tracking device such as was used in the Karo and Knotts
cases.204 This argument lost its potency as more of these kinds of cases made their way
through the courts, but no obvious reason has emerged from our analysis for why this
changed. It is entirely possible that as judges have become more familiar with such cases,
they have changed the way that they perceive the culpability of criminals who use their
cellular phones in the pursuit of their criminal goals, resulting in more denials of motions
to suppress. It is also plausible that judges have come to believe that cell phone users are
aware of the data collection that occurs with their use and accept this reality when making
decisions about what expectations of privacy are reasonable. Regardless of the reason, the
trend in this area of the law in federal court is in favor of the state.
Given the comments made by Justices Sotomayor and Alito in their concurring
opinions in U. S. v. Jones that the long term tracking of the suspect was of constitutional
significance, the question of whether the length of the surveillance in question is well
worth an investigation. 205 In the 43 cases for which this information was known, the
average length of surveillance for the twelve cases in which the defendant was successful
in getting evidence suppressed was 44 days. For the 31 cases for which this information
was known and in which the defendant was not successful in getting the evidence
suppressed, the average length of time of the surveillance was 66 days. If the courts are
concerned that long term surveillance is a violation of the privacy of suspects, one would

47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (West 2014).
See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen
Register and/or Trap & Trace for Mobile IdentificationNo. (585)111-1111, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y.
2006); In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation & Use of a Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re the
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller
Identification Sys. On Tel. Nos. [Sealed] & [Sealed], 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005).
202 In re: Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain
Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re an Application of the United States for an Order
Re-Authorizing (1) The Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device with Prospective Cell-Site Info., No. M08-533, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55739, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009).
203 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info.,
407 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (D.D.C. 2005).
204 See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation & Use of a
Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 837; See, e.g., In re the Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register &/or Trap & Trace for Mobile
Identification No. (585) 111-1111, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
205 In his opinion in U. S v. Graham, Judge Bennett, in referring to his interpretation
of the opinions in U.S. v.
Jones, said, "Accordingly, it appears as though a five justice majority is willing to accept the principle that
government surveillance over time can implicate an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy." 846 F. Supp.
2d 384, 394-404 (D. Md. 2012) (referencing 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)); See, also, In re an Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. Il-MC-0113, 2011 U. S. Dist.
LEXIS 15457 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (explaining that length of time of continuous monitoring is key in
determining whether probable cause is required to justify the release of CSLI.)
200
201
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hypothesize that longer periods of continuous surveillance would result in the courts being
20 6
more reluctant to approve the search. This hypothesis is not supported by this analysis.
One point that is worth mentioning is how these lower courts have responded to
the decision in U. S. v. Jones. Interestingly, the trespass standard that Justice Scalia
advocated has been of virtually no import to the lower court judges deciding these
cases. 2 0 7 U.S. Magistrate Judge Orenstein (S.D.N.Y.), well known and often cited for his
early opinions in this area of the law, explicitly argued that cell phone tracking cases
needed to be re-examined after the DC Circuit issued its decision in UnitedStates v.
Maynard, the case that would become United States v. Jones. The factors that were of the
most import to these re-examinations of the cell phone tracking jurisprudence were: 1) the
idea that use of the phone to track a person over an extended period of time was of greater
constitutional significance than a ping or tracking over a brief time period; and 2) the
distinction between historical and real time, or prospective, CSLI.208 Several cases arising
in New York, Massachusetts, and Texas did address the issue of tracking over time,209 but
no consensus has emerged regarding the length of time that triggers the treatment of cell
phone CSLI in the same way as the installation of a GPS tracking device.2 10
Several of the cases in the data made specific points about the distinction
between historical CSLI and real time CSLI. For example, in U. S v. Moreno-Navarez,
the judge stated, "This Court joins the Third and Fifth Circuits, as well as the majority of
the courts to address this issue . . . in concluding that there is no 'reasonable expectation
of privacy' in historical cell site data."211 In U. S. v. Graham, the court went to great
lengths to argue that the instant case was very different that the facts in U. S. v. Jones2 12
and that historical CSLI can be handled differently than real time CSLI or a tracking
device.2 By contrast, some courts have ruled that where the police intend to use a cell
phone to track the location of suspect using the global positioning function of the phone or
if they intend to use CSLI to triangulate the location of a suspect, then that is the same as
the use of a dedicated tracking device such as was used in U. S. v. Jones.214 At least one
A difference of means test was conducted and the difference between the two means was not statistically
significant.
207 Jones was only cited by 24 of the 36 of the cases
in the database that were decided after January of 2012,
when the decision in Jones was issued. Some criminal defendants attempted to get new hearings on suppression
motions in the aftermath of the Jones decision. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, No. 09-153-02, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 188445, at *2 (D.D.C. 2012).
208 In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell
Site Info., 736 F
Supp 2d 578, 582 (E.D.N.Y 2010).
209 See, e.g., id. at 578-79 (58 days); See, e.g., In re an Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing
the Release of Historical Cell Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (113 days); See, e.g., In re an
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 2011 U. S.
Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *6 (21 days); See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to
Title 18, U.S.C. § 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2012)
(210 days); See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827,
840 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (60 days).
210 It should be noted that on remand, Antoine Jones's motion to suppress 120 days of CSLI evidence was not
granted. United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 216 (D.D.C. 2012). The court refused to decide the issue on
the merits, citing to the Good Faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule. Id. at 215.
211 No. 13-CR-0841-BEN, 2013 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 143900, at *4-6
(S.D. Cal. 2013).
212 United Statesv. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945 (2012).
213 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 394-404
(D. Md. 2012).
214 See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register
Trap & Trace Device, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579-80 (W.D. Tex. 2010); In re the Application of the United States
for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Info., No. 06-MICS-004, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73324, at *13-16 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
&
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federal court has ruled that access to prospective, or "real time" CSLI always requires a
warrant,2 15 and one court expressly stated that citizens have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their movements. 216
Table 3 shows the cross-tabulation of the type of information sought by the government
with the outcome of the motion to suppress.
2 17
Table 3: Success of Motion to Suppress by Type of Information Requested

Historical CSLI

Defendant Won
7

State Won
27

(21%)

(79%)

Real time CSLI

18

19

(49%)

(51%)

Total
34
37
1

25

46

71

(35%)

(65%)

(100%)

X2

= 6.115, p<.05*

The differences are statistically significant. In the aggregate, judges are more
reluctant to grant access to real time CSLI than historical CSLI data. The reasons for this
seem fairly clear. Access to locational data wherein the suspect is in a private space can be
protected by a judge via redacting those parts of the CSLI records when the order is
initially granted. By contrast, an order for real time or prospective CSLI inherently grants
access to the suspect's location for the entire time of the order, regardless of whether the
suspect is in a private space or not. Some courts have used the terms like "intimate
portrait" to describe the consequences of granting the government complete access to a
person's location during a given time period. 218 Regardless, the key difference seems to be
the ability to protect against access to a person's location when he or she is in a private
space.
But the quantitative analysis does not reveal the full story of this area of the law.
As with all analysis of case opinion data, sometimes the quantitative analysis leaves out
important parts of the story. In this case, there are several interesting points. For example,
there were a number of cases in which the court considered the application of the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to cell phone tracking cases.219 Because the police
often had little idea what was allowed and what the legal standards are in this area of the
law, once they had relied in good faith on a court order, the courts often allowed the
evidence to be admitted, even when they had doubts about the validity of the search. 22 0
In re the Application of the United States for an Order Relating to Target Phone 2, 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940
(N.D. Ill. 2009).
216 See In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing
Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2008) vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
217 For purposes of computing the Chi-Square statistic, cases in which only
a ping was involved were omitted and
cases in which both historical and real time CSLI were sought we treated as requests for real time CSLI.
218 See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010); See also, In re an Application of the
United States for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (depicting the tracking motion of an individual as an "intimate picture" of his movements).
219 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-26 (1984).
220 See United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2013); See United States v. Espudo, 954 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1043-44 (S.D. Cal. 2013); See United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 793 (E.D. Mich.
2013); See People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S. 2d 868, 879-80 (Monroe Cnty. Ct. 2013).
215
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Additionally, some courts simply used the concept of good faith to avoid deciding the
Fourth Amendment issue.22
A key split of authority in this area of the law has to do with the impact of Smith
v. Maryland 2 2 2 The holding in that case was that suspects have no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily provided to third parties, such as phone service
providers, that is not considered content. 2 23 Thus, phone numbers dialed and cell towers
contacted are not subject to any limits in terms of police use. A number of judges have
declared that cell phone users have no privacy interests in the numbers they dial, the
location of the cell towers that their phones contact, or in historical cell site location
information. 224 All of these judges have relied heavily on the Smith v. Maryland
225
opinion. Many rely heavily on the idea that these location data have been voluntarily
given to the service provider who keeps them as a business record and that the defendant
226
has no standing to argue for the exclusion of the evidence.
The decision in Riley v. California2 2 7 may shed some light on this issue. The
Court dismissed the claim that accessing the call logs stored on a cell phone is no different
22 8
than using a pen register as was done in Smith v. Maryland.
Coupled with the Court's
detailed description of the qualitative difference between a cell phone and other types of
personal possessions, the third party doctrine is potentially weakened by the decision.
Earlier cases had held that cell phone service subscribers did not have full
knowledge of the extent to which they were providing data to the cell phone service
229
provider. More recently, a trial court judge in Texas held that the changes in the
technology are such that the courts should rethink the issue of reasonable expectation of
privacy in the context of cell phone usage.230 The issue boils down to two real questions:
221 See, for example, United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 214 (D.D.C.
2012), which was a subsequent
proceeding to the famous case of the same name; See also United States v. Muniz, H-12-221, 2013 WL 391161,
at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2013).
222 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
223 Id at 744-46.
224 See, e.g., United Statesv. Moreno-Nevarez, No. 13-CR-0841-BEN,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143900, at *3-5

&

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013) (historical CSLI); See, e.g., In Re Application of the United States for Historical Cell
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2013); See, e.g., United States v. Madison, No. 11.60285-CRROSENBAUM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105527, at *22-27 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012); See, e.g., United Statesv.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385 (D. Md. 2012) (historical CSLI); See, e.g., State v. Marinello, 49 So. 3d 488,
509-10 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (historical CSLI & numbers dialed); See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR
86, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29453, at *7-8 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (cell towers); See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 25
So. 3d 632, 634-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (historical CSLI); See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No.
1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622, at *24-28 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2008) (cell towers
historical CSLI).
225 See cases cited Supra note 224 excluding Moreno-Nevarez.
226 United Statesv. Ruby, No. 12-1073, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18997, at *17-18 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013). The
most unexamined statement of this point found in these cases was made in UnitedStates v. Gordon, No. 09-15302, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188445, at *4-5 (examining the reasonable expectation of privacy when voluntarily
revealing information to a third party).
227 Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
_, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014).
228 Id, slip op.
at *24.
229 See, for example, Judge Orenstein's oft cited opinion in the case
of In re an Application ofthe U.S. for an
Order(1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & TraceDevice, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322-23
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Unlike dialed telephone numbers, cell site data is not 'voluntarily conveyed' by the user to the
phone company. As we have seen, it is transmitted automatically during the registration process, entirely
independent of the user's input, control, or knowledge.").
230 See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp.
2d 827, 845-46 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
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1) just how much do cell phone users really know about the data they are providing to the
government via their cell phones; and, 2) just how much choice does anyone have if they
want to stay connected with the rest of the world. The answer to that second issue has as
much to do with what subjective expectations of privacy we have in a world that is
increasingly interconnected by all sorts of hand held devices that are capable of
communicating with the internet and with the rest of the world. It is the issue that Justice
Sotomayor raised in her concurrence in Jones, when she said "I for one doubt that people
would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of
every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year." 231 Chief Justice
Roberts expressly addressed the potential for invasion of privacy with regard to browser
232
history in his opinion in Riley v. California.
He wrote fairly extensively about the
pervasiveness of cell phones in Americans' lives. 233 He also cited Justice Sotomayor's
opinion in Jones favorably on the issue of location information.234
In the absences of any clear standard on this issue, federal courts turn to the good
faith doctrine235 to avoid the issue or find enough facts to rule in favor of the government
based on the absence of any search of a public space236 or they rely on the third party
doctrine to argue that the suspect has no expectation of privacy in records maintained by
the cell phone service provider. 23 7 One state trial court has held that warrantless use of
238
CSLI by the police was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. One state supreme
court,239 one state appellate court,240 and two state trial courts in Massachusetts,241 have
decided that their state constitutions provide enough protection to mandate that police
establish probable cause before using a cell phone to track a suspect. Other state courts
have ruled that the suspect did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while
242
traveling on public streets. One state appellate court has held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in historical CSLI. 2 4 3
How you fare as a criminal defendant seeking to suppress evidence of your
location gained from a warrantless search of your cell phone records depends on where
you are. Admittedly, there does not seem to be any clear pattern based on region or
political culture of the state. Defendants in Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
or Pennsylvania enjoy greater privacy rights. 244 Defendants in state courts in California,245

231
232
233

United Statesv. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. at *19 (June 25, 2014).
id.

Id., slip op. at *20.
It should be noted that some of these courts have expressed doubts about the validity of the searches in
question. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 783 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
236 See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 773, 781 (6th Cir.
2012) (giving an example of how some judges
have ruled that the CSLI did not cover any time in which the suspect was in a private space and that thus there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy).
237 See, e.g., U. S. v. Ruby, 2013 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 18997, at *15 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); Contra, State v.
Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (showing that the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly rejected the third
party doctrine).
238 Commonwealthv. Pitt, No. NOCV2010-00061, 2012 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 39, at *19 (Feb. 23, 2012).
239 Earls, 70 A.3d
at 644.
240 Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939,
954-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)
241 Commonwealthv. Wyatt, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 248, at
*28 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012);
Commonwealthv. Augustine, 2013 Mass. Super. LEXIS 116, at *15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2013).
242 See, e.g., Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); See also, People v. Hall, 86 A.D.3d
450, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
243 Louisianav. Marinello, 49 So. 3d 488, 510
(La. Ct. App. 2010)
244 See cases cited supra
note 12.
234
235
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Florida,246 Georgia,247 Louisiana,24 8 Nevada,249 or New York,250 have not fared as well,
depending on the facts of their cases. In the federal courts, judges in the Eastern District of
Michigan 251' and the Northern District of Illinois 25 2 have ruled in favor of defendants, but
not so in Georgia, 253 Maryland, 25 4 or Ohio. 25 5 In the Southern District of California it may
depend on whether you are trying to suppress historical or real time CSLI.256 The Third257
and Fifth 258 Circuits have expressly ruled that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in historical CSLI, although there are some judges in Texas that are more
sympathetic. 25 9 In federal court in New York, it may depend on the judge you get.260
People v. Fernandez, No. B214476, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1931, at * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar 16, 2011).
Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Mitchell v. Florida, 25 So. 3d 632, 633 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
247 Devega v.State, 689 S.E.2d 293,
301 (Ga. 2010).
245
246

248

Marinello, 49 So. 3d at 490.

Zuniga v. State, No 58267, 2012 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1626, at *5-6 (Nev. Nov. 29, 2012). Please note that
this is an unpublished opinion which, according to the header, has no precedential value.
250 People v. Hall, 86 A.D.3d 450, 451-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); People
v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 881
249

(N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 2013).
251 United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759,
764 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
252 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Relating to
Target Phone 2, 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 939
(N.D. Ill. 2009).
253 United Statesv. Booker, No. 1:11-cr-00255-TWT-RGV, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 188404, at *3 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 6, 2012); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622, at
*1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2008).
254 United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d
384, 385 (D. Md. 2012).
255 United States v. Dye, No. 1: 10CR221, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47287, at *25 -26 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011).
256 See United Statesv. Moreno-Navarez, No. 13-CR-0841-BEN, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143900, at *4-5 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 1, 2013) (denying motion to suppress the warrantless search of historical CSLI); United States v.
Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034-1045 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (denying a motion to suppress the warrantless search
of CSLI data by holding that, although a warrant to obtain real-time CSLI data must be supported by probable
cause, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case); United States v. Ruby, No.
12CRIO73 WQH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18997, at *18-21 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (denying motionto
suppress evidence obtained with a warrant for historical cell phone records); United States v. Reyes, No.
09CR2487-MMA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134866, at *7-11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (denying the defendant's
argument that if his attorney had moved to suppress the historical CSLI, it was reasonably likely that the court
would have granted the motion).
257 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
Disclose Records to Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2010).
258 In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 608-15
(5th Cir. 2013). The
Tenth Circuit has not directly ruled, but has stated in dicta that a ping is a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit has ruled
that tracking a suspect through his pay-as-you-go cell phone while on public roads, but not while the suspect was
in any private places, was not a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 771, 777-81
(6th Cir. 2012).
259 See, e.g., In re the Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d
827, 840-45 (S.D.
Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
260 Compare, e.g., In re the Application of the United S. for Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d
578, 578-79, 595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (requiring the government to obtain a warrant before acquiring an order
for CSLI), with In re Smarphone Geolocation Data Application, 13-MJ-242, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62605, at
*12-22 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013) (holding that a warrant can issue if the government has probable cause to
believe that geolocation data would aid in a defendant's apprehension, and defendant has no reasonable
expectation of privacy if they agreed with their carrier that their geolocation information could be provided
without consent), and United States v. Gilliam, No. 11 Crim. 1083, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130248, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012) (denying motion to suppress CSLI evidence because the Stored Communications Act
permits disclosure in emergency situations), and In re Application of United States for Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., No. Il-MC-0113, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *3-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (granting an
order for CSLI data without a warrant because the records requested were from different phones in short
durations of time, instead of one long period), andIn re Application of Order Re-Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55739, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009) ("[T]he
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Federal courts in Utah and New York have allowed warrantless access to CSLI under the
exigent circumstances provisions of the Stored Communications Act. 2 6 ' The Good Faith
argument fades in usefulness over time because more and more cases are being decided in
the federal districts and the authorities are more and more aware of the evolving legal
arguments. This is not an acceptable state of affairs on such an important issue. The
legitimacy of the courts is at stake.
PART VI: A CLEAR LEGAL STANDARD THAT PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND
INFORMS THE POLICE WHAT THEY CAN AND CANNOT DO

It is very clear that the current state of affairs is undesirable. The police are not
sure what they can and cannot do. Judges faced with requests to grant orders directing cell
phone service providers to release CSLI data, or with motions to suppress evidence, are
not sure what the legal standard is, but have a wealth of conflicting precedents to follow.
The federal courts have been highly likely to grant access to such information in the last
three years based largely on the notion that everyone knows that they are giving locational
data to their cell phone provider, but there is an argument to be made that the continued
practice of allowing, as most federal courts do, access to historical CSLI virtually on
demand goes against the grain of our history with regard to privacy. Do we really, as a
society, want to make giving the government permission to track our movements on
demand a condition for the use of a cell phone? It is not at all clear that doing so is in
accord with public opinion. Chief Justice Roberts' extensive section on the pervasiveness
of cell phones and the unique and sensitive nature of the information that can be accessed
if one controls a person's cell phone in Riley v. California262is encouraging for advocates
of digital freedom, but the legal standard for determining when and on what basis the
police may obtain access to CSLI is still unclear. Within a day of the ruling, the news
media reported that the authorities in Chicago, Illinois, were contemplating what the
ruling means for their current warrantless use of cell site simulators to track the locations
of the cell phones of suspects.2 63
This is not the case in five states. By statute in Maine and Montana, and by court
decision in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the courts know that such
orders may only issue based on probable cause and that exclusion of evidence in the
appropriate remedy. There is no confusion in these jurisdictions. They do not have to
distinguish between historical CSLI, real time CSLI, and locational pings, all of which can
plausibly be adjudicated based on differing standards in the current practice outside of
those five states.
Additionally, the issue of who owns data generated by the use of a cell phone
needs to be addressed. If the courts simply argue that all historical CSLI is a business
record maintained and owned by the service provider, the cell phone user is left with little
or no recourse. Abuses of government authority under the various statutes that might be
used do not have a remedy. Several courts have expressly held that the remedy for

government may obtain prospective cell-site information without a showing of probable cause under the 'hybrid
theory,' a combination of the authority of the Pen Register Statute and the Stored Communications Act.").
261 United Statesv. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323 (D. Utah 2013); Gilliam, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130248,
at *5.
262 573 U.S. _,
Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. § III(B)(1) at *17-21 (June 25, 2014)..
263 Stacy St. Clair and Jeremy Gorner, CourtRuling May Affect Cell Tracking
by Chicago Police, Chicago
Tribune (June 25, 2014, 10:22 pm), (last visited, June 27, 2014) http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ctchicago-cell-side-met-20 140626,0,4653045.story.
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violation of the Stored Communications Act does not include exclusion of evidence. 2 6 4
Moreover, cell phone users do not routinely scan the minutiae of their contract with the
provider to find the buried provision relating to who owns the data or whether the service
provider will release said data to law enforcement or any other third party.265 What this
approach leaves is a system in which the government can access CSLI on virtually any
cell phone user on a showing of less than probable cause. One has to question the values
implicit in a doctrine of law that permits the government to snoop on private citizens with
little or no oversight by the courts. 266 While the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
standard has problems, a clear statement that Americans have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell phone records, something that Justice Bowes did say in his opinion in
Pennsylvania v. Rushing,267 would be much more consistent with core Fourth Amendment
values.
One might argue that requiring a warrant and limiting the application of Smith v.
Marylandwould potentially leave people in danger. In cases like Pennsylvania v. Rushing
where an innocent person was in great danger of harm if the armed and murderous suspect
could not be located and apprehended quickly, it makes sense to allow cell phone service
providers to offer such access to the police immediately. The courts in both Pennsylvania
and New Jersey have made it abundantly clear that the public safety exception, as laid out
in New York v. Quarles,2681 would allow for the admission of such evidence based on
probable cause and exigent circumstances, and two federal courts have allowed the use of
269
CSLI under an exigent circumstances rationale. In the majority opinion in Riley v.
California, Chief Justice Roberts was clear in stating that the Smith v. Maryland precedent
would not be binding on the issue of accessing call logs stored on a cell phone,270 but also
271
included a section on exigent circumstances.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for a clear standard to be established is
the need for the courts to come to terms with the set of expectations that Americans have
with regard to the nature of data generated by cell phones and with the impact that cellular
phone technology has on our democracy. It is very hard in today's world to exist without a
cell phone and getting harder to actually own anything other than a smart phone, which
poses greater privacy risks than a traditional flip phone. A decision to continue to adhere
to the third party records doctrine of Smith v. Maryland272 means that the government has
the ability to track the location of virtually everyone over the age of 12 in the country with
almost no legal recourse on the part of the person being tracked. The sweeping opinion in
Riley v. Californiais not inconsistent with this point of view.

E.g., United States v. Booker, No. 1:11-cr-00255-TWT-RGV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188404, at *47-48
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2012); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111622, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2008).
265 But see U.S. v. Carabello, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 348-49 (D. Vt. 2013), in which the court cited to service
provider Sprint's terms and conditions and privacy policy regarding when they would release locational data in
emergency circumstances, as a factor in favor of ruling for the government.
266 See, e.g., Steven J. Schulhofe. More Essential than Ever: The FourthAmendment in the
Twenty-First
Century. New York: Oxford University Press 2012.
267 71 A.3d 939, 961 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
268 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-58 (1984) (finding a "public safety" exception to the requirement
that police read Miranda rights to a suspect).
269 See cases cited supra note 261.
270 573 U.S.
_, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. at 24 (June 25, 2014).
271 Id. at *26-27.
272 See 442 U.S. 735, 742-43
(1979).
264
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We are not enamored of arguments that purport to decipher the collective intent
of the founders, but it is hard to imagine that a nation founded on the principles of liberty
and freedom would countenance a society in which the pre-condition for participation in
the social and business life of the nation is to give to the government the ability to track
your location at all times. We are certain that the trespass standard that Justice Scalia
would apply to such rulings is poorly adapted to the task, inconsistent with the line of
cases that have been decided since 1967, and would result in the loss of freedom for
Americans since it would result in the government gaining the ability to track the locations
of anyone with a cell phone with little or no judicial supervision.
We are also not unsympathetic to the potential for conservative commentators to
argue that we are simply proposing another way for activist judges to further a liberal
agenda. It is true that one could argue that this is a policy matter that should be handled
by the Congress. A statutory standard like that enacted in Maine and Montana would
certainly accomplish the same goal of predictability and protection of rights without
unduly hampering the ability of the police to enforce the criminal laws. Given the current
state of affairs in the U. S. Congress, it seems unlikely that any such legislation will result
any time soon. In addition, a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution is preferable
because it will have more staying power in that shifts in the political winds would not
change how the standard is applied.27 3 Subsequent Congresses would be unable to repeal
such a decision. In the meantime, however, the courts will be faced with an increasing
number of these cases and judges must decide them as best they can.

' Justice Alito, in section II of his concurring opinion in Riley v. California, makes the opposite argument, that
the privacy of cell phone data is a matter potentially well suited to action by Congress.
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Appendix A
List of Cell Phone Tracking Cases

274

US v. Forest

2004

355 F.3d 942; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
1139; 2004 FED App. 0032P (6th Cir.)

In the Matter of an Application of
the United States for an Order (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace
Device and (2) Authorizing Release
of Subscriber Information and/or
Cell Site Information

2005

396 F. Supp. 2d294; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27480 (ED NY)

In Re Application of the United
States of America for an Order for

2005

405 F. Supp. 2d 435; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33754 (SD NY)

2005

396 F. Supp. 2d 747; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24497 (SD TEX)

2005

402 F. Supp. 2d 597; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29883 (MD 2005)

Disclosure of Telecommunications
Records and Authorizing the Use of
a Pen Register and Trap and Trace

In Re Application for Pen Register
and Trap/Trace Device with Cell

Site Location Authority
In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and a
Caller Identification System on
Telephone Numbers [sealed] and
[sealed] and the Production of Real
Time Cell Site Information

Table created with the findings from the research described supraPart V
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In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an

2005

407 F. Supp. 2d 132; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34616 (DDC)

2005

415 F. Supp. 2d 211; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7653 (WD NY)

2005

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43736 (DC)

2006

411 F. Supp. 2d 678; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3392 (WD LA)

2006

460 F. Supp. 2d 448; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76822 (SD NY 2006)

93

Order Authorizing the Release of
Prospective Cell Site Information

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and/or
Trap and Trace for Mobile
Identification Number (585) 111-

1111 and the Disclosure of
Subscriber and Activity Information
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703

In the Matter of Applications of the

United States of America for Orders
Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell
Cite Information

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States for an Order: (1)

Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device; and (2) Authorizing Release
of Subscriber Information and/or
Cell Site Information

In re: Application of the United
States for an Order for Prospective

Cell Site Location Information on a
Certain Cellular Telephone
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In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
order: (1) Authorizing the

[Vol. 4

2006

433 F. Supp. 2d 804; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40856 (SD TEX)

2006

439 F. Supp. 2d 456; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59845 (MD)

2006

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73324 (ED WI)

2006

441 F. Supp. 2d 816; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56332 (SD TEX)

Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device,
and (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber and Other Information

In the Matter of the Application for
an Order Authorizing the Installation

and Use of a Pen Register and
Directing the Disclosure of
Telecommunications Records for the
Cellular Phone Assigned the
Number [SEALED]

In the Matter of the Application of

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Information

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing (1) Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap
and Trace Device or Process, (2)
Access to Customer Records, and (3)
Cell Phone Tracking
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95

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device;
(2) Authorizing the Release of
Subscriber and Other Information;
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure
of Location Based Services; In the
Matter of the Application of the
United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device;
(2) Authorizing the Release of
Subscriber and Other Information;
and (3) Location of Cell Site
Origination and/or Termination

2006

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45643 (ND
Indiana)

In re Application of the United

2006

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11747 (SD NY)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for
Orders Authorizing the Installation
and Use of Pen Registers and Caller
Identification Devices on Telephone
Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed]

2006

416 F. Supp. 2d 390; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7345 (MD)

In the Matter of the Application of

2006

415 F. Supp. 2d 663; 2006 U.S. Dist.

States for an Order for Prospective
Cell Site Location Information on a
Certain Cellular Telephone

the united States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and use of a Pen Register with Caller
Identification Device and Cell Site
Location Authority on a Certain
Cellular Telephone

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2014

LEXIS 6976 (SD WV)

35

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3

96

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

In re Application of the United
States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States

[Vol. 4

2007

509 F. Supp. 2d 76; 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68339 (Mass 2007)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register Device, a
Trap and Trace Device, and for
Geographic Location Information.

2007

497 F. Supp. 2d 301; 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52009 (Puerto Rico 2007)

In re Application for an Order
Authorizing the Extension and Use

2007

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11692 (ED Cal
2007)

2007

622 F. Supp. 2d 411; 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77635 (SD TEX)

2008

632 F. Supp. 2d 202; 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97359 (ED NY)

U. S. v. Suarez-Blanca

2008

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an

2008

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622 (ND GA
2008)
534 F. Supp. 2d 585; 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13733 (2008 WD PA)

Code, Section 2703(d)

of a Pen Register Device, etc.

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the

Installation and use of a Pen Register
and Trap and Trace Device, and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber
and Other Information

In the Matter of an Application of
the United States of America for an

Order Authorizing the Use of Two
Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Devices

Order Directing a Provider of
Electronic Communication Service
to Disclose Records to the
Government

U. S. v. Jenious

2009

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132385 (Ed WI)
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2009

733 F. Supp. 2d 939; 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130713 (ND IL)

U.S. v. Navas

2009

640 F. Supp. 2d 256; 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37464 (SD NY)

In the Matter of an Application of
the United States of America for an
order Re-authorizing (1) The Use of
a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace
Device with Prospective Cell Site
Information; (2) The Release of
historical Cell Site and Subscriber

2009

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55739 (ED NY)

Mitchell v. State of Florida

2009

25 So.3d 632 (2009)

In re US for an Order Directing

2010

620 F3d 304 (3rd cir PA)

2010

736 F. Supp. 2d 578; 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88781 (ED NY)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an

Order Relating to Target Phone 2

Information; and (3) Authorizing the

Release of Subscriber Information,
Including Tower/Sector & Msc
Records

Provider of Elec. Commun. To
Disclose Records to the Govt
In the Matter of an Application of
the United States of America for an

Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell Site Information

In re Application of the United

2010

States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data

747 F. Supp. 2d 827; 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 115529 (SD TX)

U. S. v. Benford

2010

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29453 (ND
Indiana, 2010)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device; (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber and Other Information;
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure
of Location Based Services

2010

727 F. Supp. 2d 571; 2010 U.S Dist
LEXIS 77319 (WD TEX 2010)
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2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103385
(KANSAS 2010)
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123188 (MD FL
Fort Myers Division 2010)

U. S. v. Redd

2010

Mitchelly. Vogel

2010

Louisiana v. Marinello

2010

Devega v. The State.

2010

U. S. v. Dye

2011

49 So. 3d 488; 2010 La. App. LEXIS
1331
286 Ga. 448; 689 S.E.2d 293; 2010 Ga.
LEXIS 107; 2010 Fulton County D. Rep.
248; 49 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 635
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47287 (ED OH)

In the Matter of an Application of

2011

809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (ED NY)

2011

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156744 (DC)

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell Site Information

In the Matter of the Application of

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Historical Cell Site Information for
Telephone Number [text redacted by
the court]

In the Matter of an Application of

2011

In Re In the Matter of an Application

849 F. Supp. 2d 526; 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 85638 (Md)

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Location Information of a Specified
Wireless Telephone

2011

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457 (ED NY)

2011

444 Fed Appx 517, 2011 U. S. App
LEXIS 18957 (3rd Cir NJ 2011)

of the United States of America for
an Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell-Site Information

U. S. v. Powell
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In re: Application for a Court Order
Authorizing AT&T to Provide
Historical Cell Tower Records ; In
re: AT&T Sim Card

2011

99

55 V.I. 127; 2011 V.I. LEXIS 65

(Superior Court of the Virgin Islands,
Division of St. Thomas and St. John)

#89014103211858609369; Inre:

AT&T Black Samsung Flip Phone
Model #SGH-A197, FCC
fD#A3LSGHA197, SIN
RQBZ917758D; In re: Application

for a Court Order Authorizing
Sprint/Nextel Corporate Security to
Provide Historical Cell Tower
Records

People v. Fernandez

2011

2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1931

Tracey v. Florida

2011

69 So. 3d 992; 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS
14054; 36 Fla. L. Weekly D 1961

The People of the State of New York
v. Alexander Hall

2011

86 A.D.3d 450; 926 N.Y.S.2d 514; 2011
N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5807; 2011 NY

In the Matter of the Application of

2012

849 F. Supp. 2d 177; 2012 U.S. Dist.

Slip Op 5936
the United States of America for an

LEXIS 42779 (Mass)

Order Pursuant to Title 18, United

States Code, Section 2703(d) to
Disclose Subscriber Information and
Cell Site Information

U. S. v. Skinner

2012

690 F.3d 772 (6th cir TN)

U. S. v. Pascual

2012

502 Fed. Appx. 75; 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23272 (2nd cir NY)

U. S. v. Madison

2012

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105527 (SD

U. S. v. Graham

2012

846 F. Supp. 2d 384; 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26954 (MD 2012)

U. S. v. Hardrick

2012

U. S. v. Booker

2012

U. S. v. Jones

2012

U. S. v. Gordon

2012

U. S. v. Reyes

2012

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147940
2012)
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188404
2012)
908 F. Supp. 2d 203; 2012 U.S.
LEXIS 177294 (DC)
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188445
2012)
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134866

U. S. v. Gilliam

2012

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130248 (SD NY

Florida)
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2012)
Smarr v. The State

2012

317 Ga. App. 584; 732 S.E.2d 110; 2012
Ga. App. LEXIS 768; 2012 Fulton
County D. Rep. 2802
30 Mass. L. Rep. 270; 2012 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 248

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v.
Francis Wyatt

2012

Commonwealth v. Zeph Pitt

2012

Zuniga v. Nevada

2012

29 Mass. L. Rep. 445; 2012 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 39
2012 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1626 (2012)

U. S. v. McCullough

2013

2013 US App LEXIS 8108 (2nd cir NY)

U. S. v. Caraballo

2013

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112739 (VT)

In re: Application of the United

2013

724 F.3d 600 (5th cir TX)

2013

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62605 (ED NY)

U. S. v. Muniz

2013

U. S. v. Powell

2013

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12162 (SD TX
2013)
943 F. Supp. 2d 759; 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64804 (ED Michigan)

U. S. v. Moreno-Navarez

2013

U. S. v. Espudo

2013

U. S. v. Steve Ruby

2013

U.S. v. Barajas

2013

U. S. v. Wilson

2013

U. S. v. Takai

2013

Commonwealth v. Princiotta

2013

State v. Earls

2013

Commonwealth v. Rushing

2013

The People of the State of New York
v. Moorer

2013

Commonwealth v. Willis

2013

Commonwealth v. Augustine

2013

States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data
In re Smartphone Geolocation Data

Application

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143900 (SD Cal
2013)
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104502 (SD Cal
2013)
2013 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 18997 (SD Cal
2013)
710 F 3d 1102 (10th Cir Kan 2013)
2013 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 37783 (ND Ga
2013)
943 F. Supp. 2d 1315; 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61698 (Utah, Central Division
2013)
31 Mass. L. Rep. 68; 2013 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 32
214 N.J. 564, 70 A.3d 630, 2013 N.J.
LEXIS 735 (2013)
2013 PA Super 162; 71 A.3d 939; 2013
Pa. Super. LEXIS 1605
39 Misc. 3d 603; 959 N.Y.S.2d 868;
2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 632; 2013 NY

Slip Op 23048
31 Mass. L. Rep. 436; 2013 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 114
31 Mass. L. Rep. 415; 2013 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 116
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